om de sociale, politiske og økonomiske konsekvenser af massemordet i Indonesien for godt 40 år siden
En bortglemt massakre i et land med 234 millioner mennesker. De politiske, sociale og økonomiske konsekvenser er stadig i dag skæbnesvangre. Af en eller anden grund taler vi sjældent om dette.
”I løbet af fire måneder døde flere mennesker i Indonesien end i Vietnam på 12 år”, skrev Bertrand Russell 1967. Folkemord plejer at være intressante for vore medier og definitionen er i denne sag ikke svær at bruge: En million ubevæbnede civile blev dræbt i løbet af en meget begrænset tidsperiode. (Sammenlignet med mordet på en million civile armenier med geværer og stikvåben 1915 – 22, det systematiske drab på seks millioner jøder og romer med giftgas och skydevåben 1940–45, mordet på en million tutsier i Rwanda med køller, stikvåben og skydevåben 1994.)
Men det handler ikke bare om en million dræbte indonesiske kommunister 1965–66, men også om 1,5 millioner borgere som blev indespærret i nogle af verdens grusomste fængsler og koncentrationslejre – hvor de sad indespærrede i op til 15 år uden lov eller dom.
De som tog initiativet till massemordet fik støtte til deres kup af USA. Lige siden kuppet har de største amerikanske selskaber ligesom vesteuropæiske och japanske selskaber udbyttet landet på en usædvanlig hensynsløs måde. Flera store svenske industrivirksomheder, først og fremmest i forpakningsindustrien som anvender træ som råvare, deltager i vests udplyndring af Indonesien og har gjort det siden kupgeneralen Suhartos diktatur.
* * *
Indonesiens tidligere præsident – Den Skydeglade Suharto eller “Slagteren fra Jakarta” – en vigtig allieret for det kapitalistiske Vest gennem 30 år. * * * *
En hurtig historie-repetition: Efter befrielsekrigen mod hollænderne blev den nationale folkehelt, Sukarno, præsident. Han fremstod som anti-imperialistisk leder for de u-lande som ikke havde allieret sig med vestmagterne og bad amerikanerne gå ad helvede til med sin US-aid.
Sukarno nationaliserede en lang række amerikanske, brittiske og især store hollandske virksomheder. Han fik først og fremmest støtte af hæren og det kommunistiske parti, Partai kommunis Indonesia, som med sine tre millioner medlemmar var verdens største kommunistparti efter det sovjetiske og kinesiske. Kommunisterne var fattige landarbejdere som kæmpede for en landreform, men også intellektuelle og kunstnerer var partimedlemmer. Sukarno opgav parlamentarismen og inførte det mystiske begreb ”Guided democracy”.
1961 forsøgte CIA myrde Sukarno. I 1962 begyndte den daværende leder for CIA´s asiatiske afdelning, William Colby, at sprede rygtet om at P.K.I., det kommunistiske parti, planlagde et kup. CIA oprettede et kartotek på 20 tusind lokale kommunistiske ledere som overleveredes til oprøriske reaktionære generaler. CIA gav også oprørsgeneralerne omfattande økonomisk støtte.
(Omfattande dokumentation av USA:s politik i Indonesien fra slutningen af halvtredserne til og med kuppet findes i George Washington University´s arkiv, udlagt på nettet i National Security Archive:.
Suhartos kup kom samtidigt som økonomien var i krise og en hungerskatastrofe truede. De gudløse (= ateistiske) kommunister ude i landsbyerne blev beskyldt for komplot og sammensværgelse for at gennemføre ritual-mord. Man fulgte et gammelt hollandsk kolonialt mønster. Massemordet blev overladt til lokale godsejer-militser og lejesoldater.
Vidnesbyrd om massakrerne blev filmet af tv-selskabet ABC-News. I The troubled war och The battle for Asia synes interiører fra indonesiske fængsler. Magre, rådvilde fanger sidder på lergulv og gentager forskræmte den muslimske imamens ”Allah Akba” (“Gud er stor”). Ifølge speakerteksten skal fangerne ”genopdrages”. Kameraet bevæges forbi celle efter celle fyldte med bedrøvede unge kvinder, hvis ansigter er mærkeligt hævede. Speakeren taler om unge kvindelige fanger som skal henrettes fordi de ”har planlagt kommunistiske ritualmord”. (Det findes ikke en eneste overlevende kvindelig fange som ikke er blevet voldtaget i fængselet, siger menneskerettighedsorganisationen Syarikat Indonesia, som blev dannet så sent som år 2000).
Som en følge af Suhartos kupp bliver Indonesien skueplads for en af de største økologiske katastrofer i verden. ”Indonesien mister sine værdifulde skove i rasende takt. Sumatra og Kalimantan vil være fældet i løbet af 5 respektive 10 år”, skrev Svenska Naturskyddsföreningen i 2006. Det anslås at Suharto selv fik omkring 45 milliarder dollar i bestikkelse af de selskaber som har ført an i den hensynsløse udnyttelse og er derfor – ligesom den tidligere diktator Marcos på Filippinerne (hvor skovene også blev fældet i en rasende takt ) – en af verdens rigeste mænd.
De moralske konsekvenser virker ligeså så katastrofale. Flere end en million tidligere politiske fanger og deres børn er stadig frataget en række borgerrettigheder, de er anden klasses borgere som registreres og overvåges.
I Yogyakarta, Javas gamle hovedstad, møder jeg nogle af dem som har siddet årtier i fængelse og i lejre på fangeøen Buru. De og deres voksne børn lever under konstant overvågning. Sorg og frygt har ødelagt hele livet for disse familier. I 1965 blev de udpeget som “ritualmordere” og de bliver stadig mistænkeliggjorte.
Da Suharto faldt i 1998 efter landsomfattende strejker og optøjer, blev en freds- og forsoningskomité endeligt dannet af den politiske leder efter Suharto, Abdurrahman Wahid. Komiteen blev lovlig så sent som 2004 – men fornyligt blev den erklæret ”unconstitutional” – ulovlig. Der er hele tiden blev blevet sat forhindringer for komiteens arbejde. En eneste massegrav er åbnet, men en islamisk organisation protesterede så voldsamt at dna-prover ikke har kunnet tages. . . . . . . .
Det har heller ikke været muligt at begrave ligene normalt. De blev lagt tilbage i massegraven.
Hvad sker der i et land hvis den vigtigste samtidshistorie aldrig fortælles? Hvis historiebøgerne hopper over den?
Hvis de som lever nu , aldrig får tage stillning til hvorfor ingen tog sig af disse tusinder og atter tusinder omkringstrejfende forældraløse børn? Hvis det aldrig fortælles hvorfor vandkanalerne i visse byer, som i Surabaja, var proppet fulde med lig ?
Hvad skulle der være sket i Sydafrika hvis ikke sandheds- og forsoningskommittéerne havde arbejdet i årevis og omhyggeligt trukket de forbrydelser frem som var begået ?
Hvad ville der være sket i Europa efter Anden Verdenskrig, hvis Holocaust var blevet fortrængt ?
One of the greatest crimes of the 20th century was committed in Indonesia.
En af de “største forbrydelser i det 20.århundrede”, som det udtrykkes i en af *1) CIA´s egne analyser af folkemordet, som blev udløst af det kontrarevolutionære militærkup i oktober 1965. It was one of the few statements in the text that was correct.
Gennem 300 sider forsøger den amerikanske spion – og terrororganisation CIA at give offrerne skylden for the killings — the supporters of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) — det var deres egen skyld at de blev dræbte. The PKI had supposedly attempted a coup d’état and a nationwide uprising called the September 30th Movement (which, for some unknown reason, began on October 1).
The mass murder of hundreds of thousands of the party’s supporters over subsequent months was thus a natural, inevitable, and justifiable reaction on the part of those non-communists who felt threatened by the party’s violent bid for state power.
Alt tyder på at “kupforsøget” den 1.oktober 1965 var en “falsk flag”-operation: it claimed to have acted to defend Sukarno, but the pro-Sukarno generals in the Indonesian Army General Staff were in fact among the first to be assassinated.
I Indonesien hersker et proamerikansk kapitalistisk bourgeoisie og its uncontested ruler i flere årtier , General Suharto, var en af the most brutal dictators in history.
Et CIA-organiseret kup satte Suharto på “tronen” som führer for et USA-allieret regime i 1965. Suharto, som allerede havde samarbejdet med de hollandske kolonialister og de japanske besættelsesstyrker, decided to purge every last “Communist subversive from Indonesian soil”.
General Nasution, a former close associate of Suharto, called for the extermination of three million Indonesian communist party members.
CIA point man Colonel Sarwo Eddie personally supervised the murderous purge. Paratroopers would arrive in a region with a list of “subversives” and provide it to local vigilante groups. Using machetes and other crude weapons, the vigilantes would hack the alleged subversives to death.
Entire populations of towns and villages were herded to central locations and massacred. Children would be asked to identify “communists” who would then be executed on the spot. In addition to the half million people who were killed outright after the coup, another 750.000 were arrested and tortured. Ultimately, one million people died in one of the most savage mass slaughters of modem political history.
Ironically, the New York Times reported in December 1965, two months after the purge began, that “from an American viewpoint” Suharto’s new government in Indonesia “represents a positive achievement.” Apparently so, for the U.S. continues to this day to train and arm the Indonesian military with the latest high-tech equipment.
Redaktørerne på det liberale “Time magazine” hyldede Suharto-gruppens blodige magtovertagelse med ordene “The West’s best news for years in Asia.”
Storbritanniens ambassador, Andrew Gilchrist, wrote to London: “I never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change.”
News of the massacre was carefully controlled by Western intelligence agencies. Journalists, prevented from entering Indonesia, relied on the official statements from Western embassies. Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt commented in the New York Times :
“With 500,000 to 1 million Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place.”
Den amerikanske oliebaron H.L. Hunt proclaimed Indonesia the sole bright spot for the U.S. in the Cold War and called the ouster of Sukarno the “greatest victory for Freedom since the last decisive battle of World War II.”
On October 8, 1965, right-wing mobs ransacked the offices of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and its mass organizations in Jakarta, the capital city. Ten days later, in densely populated Central Java, angreb paramilitære styrker under den pro-amerikanske general Suharto´s kommando PKI. Tens of thousands of PKI cadre and supporters were rounded up at night, detained, and executed. Anti-communist youth groups were supplied with weapons by the army and sent out to murder PKI members and supporters in thousands of towns and villages. In one area of Central Java known as a stronghold of the party, one-third of the population died in the massacre.
In order to justify this campaign of extermination, the army told people in the towns and villages that the PKI was about to go on a killing spree against all non- communists. PKI members were accused of digging mass graves, compiling lists of people to be executed, and stockpiling special instruments to gouge out eyeballs. *3)
Hvordan kunne dette ske ?
Sammenligner vi situationen for folkene i Viet Nam, Kina og Indonesien i 1945 er det ikke svært at se lighederne :
Den Røde Hærs og de antifascistiske modstandsbevægelsers sejr over de Euro-japanske imperialistiske styrker i Antikomintern-pagten i 1945, udløste de undertrykte folks befrielseskamp overalt på jordkloden, fra Cuba til Algeriet, Kina, Viet Nam og Indonesien. I både Viet Nam og Indonesien var de kommunistiske partier opstået under inspiration fra Den Store Socialistiske Oktoberrevolution i CzarRusland i 1917. Partierne voksede sig store med støtte fra KOMINTERN, den Kommunistiske Internationale som Lenin og Stalin havde stiftet i 1919. Og de havde efter den Røde sejr i 1945 en så stor folkelig demokratisk støtte at de var i stand til at bestemme den politiske udvikling. Mens den politiske udvikling i Indonesien og Viet Nam sluttede med sejr for Viet Nams folk over USA-imperialismen, blev Indonesien folk tvunget til at underkaste sig USA med vold og terror efter det kontrarevolutionære kup i 1965.
I 1965, the PKI was a formidable organization. It had 3,5 million members and was the largest communist party in the world that was out of power.
The PKI’s allied organizations claimed a combined membership of nearly 20 million out of a total population of 110 million. It had ministers and staffers in governmental bodies from the national cabinet to local municipalities.
However, since the early 1950s, the PKI had adopted a political line and strategy of a peaceful path to socialism. By building an alliance with the “progressive sectors” of the government, the PKI believed that Indonesia’s reactionary pro-imperialist forces, with their core in the army, could be prevented from making a decisive move to close off the party’s gradual march to power. Thus, the PKI and its followers were politically and militarily disarmed in 1965 and were left without effective options in confronting the army-led death squads.
At the decisive moment, the PKI expected President Sukarno and sympathetic military officers would come to their aid. While Sukarno called for peace, pro-American General Suharto ignored him and proceeded to gradually strip Sukarno of power. Suharto’s three decade-long military dictatorship turned Indonesia into a compliant U.S. neo-colony in Southeast Asia.
The role of the CIA and the U.S. military in this bloody counter-revolution has become more exposed over the years. However, the causes for this defeat that were internal to the PKI have not been examined closely enough.
This is not simply a question of setting the historical record straight. Without a deeper understanding of fundamental errors in the PKI’s political line and work, the massacre in 1965 will continue to cast a long shadow over revolutionary activists with the message that imperialism and reactionary regimes are too powerful to challenge. An analysis of these events also provides some critical lessons for communist and anti-imperialist forces worldwide, especially concerning countries where peaceful, electoral paths to “socialism,” or some variant, are being pursued.
* The PKI under Dutch Colonial Rule and Japanese Occupation * *
An understanding of the roots of the PKI’s traumatic defeat in 1965 requires a brief examination of the political line and work of the PKI during three periods: The struggle against Dutch colonialism in the 1920s and 1930s; the Japanese occupation from 1942-1945; and the independence struggle against the Dutch from 1945-1949.
Founded in 1920, the PKI was the first communist party in Asia efter dannelsen af Lenins og Stalins Ruslands Kommunistiske Parti(bolsjeviker) . The early development of the PKI was due in large part to successful work within the Saraket Islam (Islamic Association), especially its trade union and peasant branches. Saraket Islam was the first nationalist organization that advocated full independence, with a membership of two and a half million in 1919.
Social conditions also favored the rapid growth of the PKI in the early 1920s. The Dutch colonialists systematically plundered the vast natural resources of Indonesia, including its rubber, sugar, tin and tobacco. Seasonal laborers on Dutch sugar plantations earned less than ten cents (U.S.) per day.
Den hollandske kolonimagt og kapital had no interest in colonial education, other than training a small number of Indonesian civil servants. Kun 204 af studenterne i den hollandske koloni Indonesiens højere læreanstalter kom i 1938 fra indonesiske familier. *4)
In 1925, the leadership of the PKI embarked on a course of preparing for an insurrection to overthrow Dutch rule. A strike by railway workers was to be the signal for a general strike that would launch a broad-based revolutionary upsurge. The uprisings in West Java and West Sumatra in 1926-27 gained insufficient popular support and were suppressed quickly by the colonial authorities. The PKI was banned, and most of the
PKI’s leaders were arrested and deported to a concentration camp on New Guinea. *5) I 1935, Musso, in his capacity as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, returned from exile in the Soviet Union to establish an “Illegal PKI” based in Surabaja, East Java, but the PKI was not a major force in Indonesia as World War II began.
Non-communist nationalists stepped into the political vacuum, led by Achmed Sukarno, the charismatic son of a Javanese teacher, who developed a hybrid form of nationalism, Islam and socialism to guide the independence struggle. The two political parties that Sukarno led during the late 1920s and early 1930s, the PNI and the Gerindo, upheld the demand for independence, but declined after Sukarno’s arrest in 1932.
Sukarno was released by the Japanese in 1942, when they were looking to prop up native political leadership to disguise their occupation of Indonesia as liberation from the Dutch.
During World War II, Sukarno and his close ally, Mohammed Hatta, helped secure popular acceptance of Japanese rule and mobilized support for the Japanese war effort, producing later charges that he had been a “fascist collaborator.”
In Sukarno’s view, he was using his position and frequent radio broadcasts to spread nationalist ideas among the masses and force concessions from the Japanese, leading to self- government.*6)
The PKI’s forces were divided geographically during World War II.
En gruppe *7) led by Sardjono worked for the Allies at a propaganda center in Australia.
A group of Indonesian intellectuals spent the war years working underground in the Netherlands with the Dutch Communist Party. A third group, the Illegal PKI, operated inside Indonesia.
Det illegale PKI worked within an underground intelligence network led by Amir Sjarifuddin that was funded by the Dutch. This network was broken up by the Japanese political police in 1943. The chairman of the PKI when it surfaced in 1945, Muhammed Jusef, was part of a guerilla group that sabotaged rail lines in West Java. The PKI underground infiltrated the Peta, the Indonesian self-defense units set up by the Japanese, with the aim of organizing its members for uprisings against the Japanese in the event of an Allied landing in Indonesia. There were two mutinies in Peta units in 1944 at Blitar and Indramaju.
The Illegal PKI also developed work in several Japanese-run training institutes in Jakarta, where communist youth, including the future leader of the PKI in the 1950s and early 1960s, D.N. Aidit, secretly planned to overthrow first Japanese and then Dutch colonial rule. *8)
However, due to political and organizational weaknesses, these PKI groups were not able to develop organized guerilla warfare against the Japanese imperialists. *9) Conditions were ripe for such a struggle against the Japanese occupation forces, which brutally oppressed the Indonesian people. Forced labor (“romusha”) sent 300.000 Indonesian men as far away as Burma to build roads from which only 70.000 returned. Thousands of Indonesian women were forced into sexual slavery to service the Japanese troops.
A system of forced rice deliveries created widespread hunger and suffering in the countryside. Numerous localized peasant rebellions were directed against the Japanese and local collaborators, but they were mainly led by traditional religious leaders. It was not until 1945 that the PKI was able to pull together its scattered groupings into a politically unified force.
Kampen for national uafhængighed i Indonesien: 1945-1949
As in the Philippines, there was considerable potential for the PKI to make revolutionary advances with the defeat of Japan and with the severe dislocations of Dutch colonial power that took place during the war. However, these opportunities were lost during the struggle for independence due to a lethal combination of rightist and “left” adventurist actions.
On August 17, 1945, just days after the Japanese surrender to the Allied imperialists, the Republic of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta. Throughout cities and towns on Java, the pemuda (youth) began to take over Japanese government offices, and then began to seize arms.
First in Semerang and then in Surabaja, armed pemuda engaged in heavy combat with Japanese forces. By the end of October, most of Central and East Java was in Indonesian hands. A mass of heterogeneous armed groups and badan perdjuangan (struggle organizations) sprouted up all over Java.
At the same time, the Sukarno government began to organize a new Indonesian army.
Its top commanders had served in the Dutch colonial army, but the bulk of it was composed of members of the Peta, the strongly nationalist local self-defense forces organized by the Japanese. The Republican army was built up slowly by disbanding and incorporating local militias into regular units. The pacesetter in this effort was Colonel A.H. Nasution, who led the Siliwangi Division in West Java, and who later became a prominent pro-U.S. general.
Since the Dutch did not have any significant military forces in the region yet, it fell to the British to protect Western imperialist interests in Indonesia. In September and October, the British moved in largely Indian and Nepalese Gurkha troops, allegedly for the sole purpose of repatriating Japanese forces and Dutch internees. However, when the British demanded that the Indonesian forces in the port city of Surabaja disarm, heavy fighting broke out between the British and nationalist forces, including PKI-led units. Most of a British-led brigade was overrun at one point. Even with the use of tanks, air power and naval bombardment, it took the British forces three weeks to retake the city. The Battle of Surabaya was an important turning point for the Indonesian people, as it demonstrated their willingness to fight and die for independence in large numbers.
On October 21, as armed conflict with the Japanese and the British raged on much of Java, the PKI appeared as an open organization for the first time since the uprisings of 1926-1927. The PKI formed regional branches in seven cities on Java and established a Lasjkar Merah (Red Militia). At its congress in January 1946, the PKI asserted that the Suharto-Hatta leadership was struggling for “independence for the bourgeoisie.” The party opposed negotiations with the Dutch and demanded an end to the disarming of popular organizations by the government.
However, several weeks later a group of PKI members who had worked with the Dutch in Australia during World War II met in Jogjakarta to oppose the Jusef leadership. At a new congress held in April, the returned exiles led by Sardjono took full command of the PKI and scrapped the program of the First Congress.
The purged PKI stated that the immediate task was to defend and strengthen the government “as a democratic structure, through the formation of a national front to oppose fascist-reactionary colonialism.” From this point until early 1948, the PKI supported the cabinets formed by the right wing “socialist” Sutan Sjahrir, including their repeated attempts to find a negotiated settlement short of “100% independence.”
While the Republican government negotiated, the Dutch imperialists came to reclaim their prize colony. By 1946, when the British withdrew, the Dutch had landed 90.000 troops in Indonesia. The next three years were characterized by on-and-off fighting and protracted negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch. The Linggajati talks in September 1946 produced a truce. In the summer of 1947, the Dutch military launched attacks that shrank the areas of nationalist control to Central Java and part of Sumatra.
After five months of fighting, an agreement was signed on the U.S. carrier Renville. The Renville agreement set up a “United States of Indonesia,” in which the Republic would br outweighed by the Dutch-controlled outer islands. A year later, the Dutch repudiated the agreement and launched a second major attack, occupying the main Republican controlled areas. These Dutch incursions created new opportunities for extensive guerilla warfare. By early 1948, the 145.000 Dutch troops in Indonesia were stretched thin and were more on the defensive than the offensive.
During 1946 and 1947, the PKI’s guerilla forces developed substantial experience. However, the party attached itself politically to the rightist policies of the Sukarno-Hatta-Sjahrir government, giving up its independence and initiative within the united front against the Dutch colonialists. The PKI supported the Linggajati and Renville agreements, thereby undercutting its ability to rally the most radical sections of the independence movement.
* The 1948 Madiun Provocation and a Premature Attempt to Seize Power *
The political polarization within the Republic between the Sukarno government and a variety of leftist forces blev understøttet af den angloamerikanske imperialismes “kold krigs”-erklæring mod Sovjetunionen og den kommunistiske verdensbevægelse som den britiske politiker Winston Churchill´s åbent havde udskreget i talen om “jerntæppet” i marts 1946 *10) . hvor den britiske politiker advarede mod den “kommunistiske femtekolonne” i Vest- og Sydeuropa”.
På den iberiske halvø var den “kommunistiske femtekolonne” dog ingen trussel mod den kapitalistiske frihed til at udbytte arbejderklassen og folkeflertallet. Det var de fascistiske regimer i Madrid og Lissabon under Franco og Salazar, som USA og Storbritanien aktivt støttede, en garanti for.
Den internationale kommunistiske bevægelse under ledelse af Stalins AKP (b), Sovjetunionens erfarne regeringsparti gennem næsten 30 år med resultater som skabte dyb og ærlig respekt og beundring i brede kredse i arbejderklassen og langt ind i ikke kommunistiske kredse blandt jordens lande og folk, tog bestik af situationen efter imperialismens åbne aggresive “kold krigs”-erklæring.
Efter omfattende diskussioner og marxistisk-leninistiske analyser, blev det Kommunistiske Informationsbureau KOMINFORM oprettet i 1947. Imperalismen skulle snart få at føle revolutionære modstand til de aggresive planer på at underkue Sovjetunionens, den komnmunistiske bevægelse og de undertrykte folk i kolonierne som USA, England og dets vasaller i Europa stadig betragtede som deres “koloniale baggård”. Allerede i 1946 havde Syriens folk tilkæmpet sig selvstændighed med Sovjetunionens støtte og hjælp, og udråbt den Arabiske Republik Syrien * الجمهوريّة العربيّة السّوريّة * (Al-Jumhuriyya al-Arabiyya al-Suriyya).
Støtte for revolutionary struggles in Indokina (Viet Nam), Malaysia, Kina and elsewhere was proclaimed as part of a worldwide battle between two camps—the capitalist camp led by the U.S., and the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Overalt på jordkloden blev imperialismen udfordret, fra Kina, Korea til Viet Nam, Laos, Algeriet og Cuba.
Det var dog ikke alle partier som var i stand til at gøre en marxistisk-leninistisk analyse af den nationale situation og dermed orientere sig i klassekampen og lede den nationale befrielseskamp til sejr. Det viser udviklingen i Indonesien. Mest åbenlyst var forvirringen i det Jugoslaviske Parti anført af den højreopportunistiske Tito-gruppe.
Ifølge USA´s Kold Krigs politik blev alle politiske ledere af de såkaldte “underudviklede” lande og “kolonier” som krævede selvstændighed og uafhængighed af de kapitalistiske stormagter og dermed “neutralt” tage stilling, uden indblanding fra USA eller andre stormagter, til deres egen og verdens udvikling, blev betragtet og udpeget som Communist stooges.
U.S.A-imperialismen made a habit of using CIA covert operations to overthrow such leaders: Mossadegh in Iran (1953), Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, Svinebugt-invasionen for at styrte Castro-regimet i Cuba i 1961, Souvanna Phouma in Laos in 1960, Salvador Allende i Chile i 1973. Sukarno was yet another such leader targeted for removal. Hverken Irans Massadegh, Guatemalas Arbenz, Cubas Castro eller Chiles Allende var revolutionære kommunister eller marxist-leninister.
In early 1948, this orientation was taken up by the PKI and the FDR (People’s Democratic Front), in which the PKI played a leading role. The FDR denounced the agreements with the Dutch and advocated that the Republic set up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In August 1948, Musso returned to Indonesia after 12 years in the Soviet Union with a plan entitled: “A New Road for the Indonesian Republic.”
Within weeks, Musso reorganized the PKI, brought the left wing of the Socialist Party and the youth organization Pesindo into the party’s ranks, and launched a political offensive to take leadership of the Republic from Sukarno and Hatta.
Alarmed by the new direction taken by the PKI, the Sukarno-Hatta forces and army commanders such as Nasution set out to demobilize PKI-led militias and PKI- influenced military units within two divisions of the Republican army.
This led to growing friction between the army and the PKI’s military forces in Central and East Java. After a series of provocations by the army, including kidnappings of PKI cadre, fighting broke out in Solo on September 16.
Two days later in nearby Madiun, mid-level leaders of the PKI and its militia, expecting an imminent attack by the Siliwangi division from West Java, staged a revolt. They disarmed other groups and declared a regional Republic.
The seizure of power at Madiun was reinforced by the arrival of Musso, who declared a new all-Indonesian Republic and denounced Sukarno as a collaborator with the Japanese and the Dutch. President Sukarno responded by making a speech calling for the forcible suppression of the revolt. The top PKI leaders, including Musso, were killed in action or executed. 35.000 PKI members and supporters were imprisoned; thousands were killed. Den hvide fascistiske terror only ended when the Dutch attacked the Republic in early 1949.
While the PKI uprising at Madiun was provoked by right-wing forces in the army, it took the form a localized putsch. It revealed the lack of an overall strategy of developing the peasant movement and guerilla warfare with independent communist leadership, which establishes political power in base areas as the revolutionary struggle develops. Had the PKI adopted such a strategy, it would have been much more difficult for the right-wing elements in the Republic to provoke the PKI into a premature attempt to seize power.
This defeat of the PKI led to a gradual shift in the attitude of the U.S. imperialists to the Indonesian Republic. From 1945-1948, the U.S. had backed the Dutch, as part of trying to rebuild and politically fortify Western Europe against the Soviet Union by means of the Marshall Plan. However, the U.S. saw an opportunity to bring into being an “independent” Indonesia led by anti-communist forces under which the U.S. would replace the Dutch as the dominant imperialist power. This reflected the U.S.’ new post- war, post-European colonial strategy in Asia, i.e. a strategy of neo-colonialism.
In the middle of the Dutch offensive in 1949, the U.S. intervened, through the United Nations, to force an end to the fighting and the signing of another neo-colonial “independence” agreement. The Hague Agreement called for a federated “Republic of the United States of Indonesia,” payment of reparations to the Dutch for seized property, and an assumption of the colonial debt. The Dutch kept the eastern province of West Irian (Papua). *11) Selvom Holland blev tvunget til at anerkende Indonesiens selvstændighed i 1949 var det stadig holandske monopoler som own and operate almost all of Indonesia’s inter- island shipping, banking, trade companies, and agricultural estates. China and the Soviet Union immediately denounced this agreement and called the Sukarno-Hatta government a “reactionary, neo-colonial regime.”
As the PKI *12) would later sum up, from 1945 to 1949 the party did not take advantage of a favorable situation for developing people’s war based in Java and other islands–agrarian revolution and guerilla warfare based in the peasantry within a broad anti-Dutch, anti-feudal united front. Such a strategy had the potential of mobilizing the vast majority of the people against the Dutch colonialists under communist leadership. Moreover, it would have strengthened the PKI for a protracted revolutionary struggle against the post-1949 bourgeois Indonesian state.
While the PKI leadership did not seriously consider taking this road to revolution during the struggle for independence, ikke engang efter den væbnede folkerevolutions sejr i Kina i 1949.
What did the leaders of the PKI learn from the 1945-1949 period? Unfortunately they drew the wrong lessons. Returning from exile, a new leadership under D.N. Aidit took over the PKI in 1951.
The militant trade union federation SOBSI, which was strongly influenced by the PKI, led a wave of strikes in 1950-51. Even after the PKI experienced another wave of persecution that drove it underground for a year, the PKI announced its intention in early 1952 to rebuild the party by renouncing armed revolutionary struggle, and by hewing to a peaceful path to a “people’s democratic government.”
In order to build an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, the PKI set a new policy of supporting Sukarno and the Indonesian state. As part of the price to establish an alliance with the Sukarno government and assure the party’s legality, the PKI agreed to dissolve the PKI-Malam (Night Time)—the underground organization of the party— and to disband a small PKI-led guerilla force in Central Java.
As Rex Mortimer wrote in Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno, “The PKI sought a peaceful road to power in Indonesia and this was an aim from which the Aidit leadership never deviated… Animated by a nationalist and accommodating spirit, and conscious both of the strength of its foes and the weakness of its own position, the party resolved to stick like a leech to Sukarno and, by a combination of ingratiation and carefully staged pressure, to insert itself into his power structure.”
The PKI’s abandonment of the necessity of providing revolutionary leadership to the struggle to end the exploitation and oppression of the Indonesian people revealed itself as a revisionist political line. For the PKI under Aidit’s leadership for the next 15 years, every step it took along the peaceful road to socialism–every joint appearance with Sukarno, every PKI member appointed to a government position–made it more difficult to change course. The PKI leadership was dizzy with success. Rapid gains in party membership and political influence were seen as indicators that the PKI had developed the capacity to take the reins of power in a short period of time.
The PKI hailed Bung (Brother) Sukarno as the leader of the revolution, and stated that its ideology and Sukarno’s were essentially the same. The Aidit leadership promoted Sukarno’s ideology of Nasakom, an acronym for Nationalisme, Agama (religion) and Komunisme. The PKI also adopted Pantjasila, Sukarno’s five principles for the Indonesian state: belief in God, nationalism, humanism, social justice and people’s sovereignty.
The PKI claimed that the implementation of Sukarno’s 1959 Political Manifesto (Manipol), which called for a two-stage “revolution” leading to “socialism,” was the same as implementing the PKI’s own program.
Sukarno, for his part, came to view the PKI as the most consistent and hard working supporter of his nationalist foreign policy and episodic progressive domestic initiatives, such as the repudiation of most of Indonesia’s debt to the Netherlands in the late 1950s. The PKI and its mass organizations provided the feet on the ground for Sukarno’s initiatives, and he protected the party from repression by the army for more than ten years.
The Bandung Line
Sukarno’s assertion of Indonesia’s leadership among the “non-aligned nations” took shape in his hosting of the Bandung Conference. Held in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, this conference was a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent and had conflicts with one or more imperialist powers. It included countries such as Egypt, India and Indonesia, a number of anti-communist states (including members of the U.S.-initiated Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), and Mao´s People’s Republic of China.
The “Bandung line,” as advocated within the international communist movement at the time, either misunderstood or largely ignored the class character of these newly independent states and the neo-colonial relations within them, especially new mechanisms for political and economic control and military cooperation developed by the U.S. under the banner of “anti-colonialism.”
On the one hand, most of these countries were ruled by the national bourgeoisie (represented, for example, by Sukarno and by Nkrumah in Ghana) with varying degrees of popular support from the petty bourgeoisie, workers and peasants. On the other hand, comprador bourgeois and feudal elements held strong points of economic and political power, backed up by the European and U.S. imperialists. Thus, these countries had not broken out of the Western economic orbit, and their political independence rested on shaky ground.
Even though Sukarno’s nationalism was not fully anti-imperialist, it was seen as a threat by the U.S., which was attempting to build a wall of reactionary states around the Soviet Union and China. Thus, the U.S. supported a series of unsuccessful revolts by reactionary Islamic forces in Indonesia’s outer islands during 1957-58 in an attempt to dismember Indonesia. Two attempts were made on Sukarno’s life.
Sukarno took the opportunity to declare a state of emergency in 1957, which lasted until 1963. In 1959 he instituted a system of “guided democracy,” supported by the PKI and the army. Elections were cancelled indefinately, and Sukarno ruled by decree with the aid of a hand-picked National Assembly. Military officers were brought into the government for the first time. After the seizure of Dutch properties by PKI-led workers in 1957, Sukarno authorised the military to take over control and management of the companies. A typical Sukarno speech railed at “colonialism and imperialism,” and he allowed the PKI to operate openly. However, during these years Sukarno also forged an alliance with the armed forces, which was a major and ultimately decisive component of the continuing imperialist domination of Indonesia. –
* The PKI Advances along a Peaceful Path
During this period, the PKI made significant progress in implementing the peaceful path to power it had mapped out. By 1957, it was the largest political party in Java, the most densely populated island. The 1957 elections gave the party an absolute majority in legislative assemblies in twelve areas on Java. In the late 1950s, the governor of Bali brought PKI members into the civil service. Aidit and Political Bureau member Njoto were appointed as advisory ministers to Sukarno in 1962, and Njoto became a member of an enlarged cabinet in 1964.
The PKI built up its nationalist credentials by supporting Sukarno’s campaigns to free West Irian from Dutch colonialism in 1962, to oppose the formation of a neo- colonial Malaysia in 1963-64,38 and to pull Indonesia out of the United Nations in 1965 after Malaysia was admitted. During these years, the PKI stressed the importance of national struggle against external imperialist forces over class struggle. This posture allowed the PKI to avoid sharp conflicts with the forces of internal reaction, strengthen the party’s relationship with the president, and enable it to grow rapidly during the early 1960s.
Sukarno addressed the PKI’s Sixth Congress in 1959, where he stated that he was “very pleased with the PKI…because the PKI clearly states that it is indispensable to have national unity.”
Sukarno increasingly defined himself as a visionary exponent of “Indonesian socialism,” and even announced in 1965 that Indonesia was entering the stage of socialism. Sukarno peppered his speeches with overheated references to “revolution” (e.g., “the world today is a revolutionary ammunition dump” and “our revolution is a summing up of many revolutions in one generation”) with no hint of any of the specific changes he wanted to make in Indonesia or how to realize them. All of this verbiage amounted to rhetorical calls for more social justice in a neo-colonial country in which the critical levers of power were held by big landlords and bureaucrat capitalists and, most importantly, by the army.
In relation to the armed forces, the PKI’s strategy was to avoid a confrontation at all costs. Instead, it relied on Sukarno and “progressive forces” within the government and the military to keep the “reactionary forces” in check. Meanwhile the PKI worked to insert its cadre as government personnel and shift the balance of forces in its favor. As a result of the campaigns against the outer island secessionist movements, and the West Irian and Malaysia campaigns, the PKI had developed a network of supporters in the armed forces. It was more influential in the air force and navy than the more right-wing and much larger 300.000 strong army.
Fra 1958 til 1965 the U.S. trained, funded, advised, and supplied the army precisely so that it could turn itself into a state within a state. The army gradually made itself the government-in-waiting, waiting for an incident like the 30 September movement to occur. They were busy creating the conditions for it and preparing themselves for dealing with it.
During the campaign to crush the U.S.-instigated rebellions in the outer islands in the late 1950s, Sukarno agreed to arm some local forces of the PKI. However, after the defeat of the PRRI-Permesta and Darul Islam, he required the armed units of the PKI to disarm or be integrated into the Indonesian army.
In a lecture to the army staff and command school in 1963, Aidit, in his capacity as a government minister, stressed that the armed forces were an instrument of the people, and their function was to implement Sukarno’s policies. In another lecture at the Naval Academy in 1964, Aidit called for the armed forces to “serve the struggle of the Indonesian people” and advocated “the doctrine of the oneness between the armed forces and the people.” These speeches, of course, rang alarms bells in the American embassy.
Aidit’s Theory of a “State with Two Aspects”
In early 1963, Aidit announced the new theory that the Indonesian state had a “pro-people’s aspect” and an “anti-people’s aspect.” The first aspect was composed of the “progressive stands and policies of President Sukarno supported by the PKI and other groups of the people…. The second aspect represents the enemies of the people manifested by the stands and policies of the right-wing forces and die-hards. The people’s aspect has now become the main aspect and takes the leading role in the Republic.” I en series of speeches at the army staff school in 1964, Aidit elaborated, “The important problem in Indonesia now is not to smash the state power as in the case in many other states, but to strengthen and consolidate the pro-people’s aspect…and to eliminate the anti-people’s aspect.”
This peaceful transformation would take place by “revolutionary action from above and below.” By “revolution from above” the PKI meant that it would “encourage the state power to take revolutionary steps aimed at making the desired changes in the personnel and in the state organs.” By means of ‘revolution from below,” the PKI would “arouse, organize and mobilize the people to achieve the same changes.”
This revisionist theory of “a state with two aspects” was in direct opposition to the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the nature of the capitalist state. Historical experience has demonstrated that the state can be an instrument in the hands of either the exploiting classes or the proletariat, but it cannot serve the interests of both. Time and again, the bourgeoisie has demonstrated that it will not hesitate to use the armed organs of the state to violently suppress any serious challenge to its rule. Thus no fundamental change in the social system can be brought about without disintegrating and overthrowing this reactionary state machine, especially its armed forces.
* The PKI and the International Communist Movement *
The theory that the Indonesian state had “two aspects” was adopted by the PKI even as it publicly sided with the Chinese Communist Party against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. As polemics raged between revolutionaries and revisionists, the PKI leaders took whatever fit their own political strategy from the Soviet and Chinese parties.
In the late 1950s, the PKI leadership was squarely in line with the CPSU: Maintaining world peace, and promoting peaceful competition and peaceful coexistence with imperialism and the peaceful transition to socialism (the “three peacefuls”) were the foremost tasks of Communist Parties. The Soviet Union sought to influence Sukarno and the PKI and build up the Soviets’ anti-imperialist credentials by shipping large quantities of arms to Indonesia between 1958 and 1965 to be used in conflicts with pro-U.S. secessionists in the outer islands, the Dutch in West Irian and the British in Malaysia.
After the 81 Parties meeting in Moscow in 1960, the PKI took an intermediate position. It endorsed most Soviet positions but backed the CCP on the need for more militant anti-imperialist struggle and a focus on the peasantry. However, the PKI was not interested in the CCP’s views on the necessity for armed struggle and the importance of struggling for communist leadership in nationalist movements. So when the PKI finally came down on the side of the CCP, “for all practical purposes the PKI came to endorse the road of armed struggle as applicable to everyone but itself.” Mortimer recollects that in talks with PKI leaders in November 1964, he was struck by “their ability in the same breath to insist on the necessity of armed struggle and to justify their own peaceful strategy.”
One of the arguments that Aidit used to justify his rejection of an armed struggle for power was that “Indonesia has no frontiers with a country already completely .. . . . . . . . . .. to be contiued
*1) CIA-rapporten fra 1968 blev forfattet af Helen Louise Hunter.
Since declassified documents confirm U.S. and other western government complicity in this singular episode of mass murder. I 1968, the National Intelligence Estimate for Indonesia reported:
“An essential part of the Suharto government’s economic program…has been to welcome foreign capital back to Indonesia. Already about 25 American and European firms have recovered control of mines, estates, and other enterprises nationalized under Sukarno. Liberal legislation has been enacted to attract new private foreign investment…. There is substantial foreign investment in relatively untapped resources of nickel, copper, bauxite, and timber. The most promising industry…is oil.” – – – –
*3) John Roosa, “Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia, 2006, side 26. John Roosa’s værk er en værdifuld informationskilde om det USA-støttede fascistiske kup. Roosa fremlægger også en detailed analysis of the origins and actions of the September 30 Movement, which provided Suharto and the U.S. with the pretext to suppress the PKI.
*4) George T. Kahin, “Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia”, 1952, siderne 25, 32
*5) Kahin side 84, 86. Kahin vurderer at flere end 5 tusind mennesker deltog i disse opstande. Se også “The Rise of Indonesian Communism”, 1965, in which Ruth McVey traces the early years of the PKI up to its temporary eclipse in 1927.
*6) Sukarno often concluded his speeches with “Long Live Japan!” followed by “Long Live the Land and the People of Indonesia!” J.D. Legge, “Sukarno: A Political Biography”, 1972, side 163.
*7) Arnold Brackman, “Indonesian Communism”, 1963, side 34.
*8) Benedict O’G. Anderson, “Java in a Time of Revolution, Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946”, 1972, siderne 36-60.
*9) PKI lederen Aidit udtalte senere, “ Party also had no experience in armed struggle, something very necessary in a period of revolution.” citeret fra A.Brackman, side 43.
*10) Den højreliberale britiske politiker Winston Churchill,
som havde tabt det britiske valg i 1945 til Arbejderparttiet (Labour) kaldte med sin tale om “jerntæppet” i marts 1946 alle USA, Englands og Europas højreliberale, reaktionære, revanchistiske og neofascistiske kræfter til politisk og økonomisk kold krig mod den kommunistiske bevægelse og Sovjetunionen.
“Churchill was invited to Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri i marts 1946 where he gave this speech. President Harry S. Truman joined Churchill on the platform and listened intently to his speech.
Churchill began by praising the United States, which he declared stood “at the pinnacle of world power.” It soon became clear that a primary purpose of his talk was to argue for an even closer “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain—the great powers of the “English-speaking world”—in organizing and policing the postwar world. In particular, he warned against the expansionistic policies of the Soviet Union.
In addition to the “iron curtain” that had descended across Eastern Europe, Churchill spoke of “communist fifth columns” that were operating throughout western and southern Europe.
Truman and many other U.S. officials warmly received the speech. Churchill’s “iron curtain” phrase immediately entered the official vocabulary of the Cold War. Men U.S. officials were less enthusiastic about Churchill’s call for a “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain.
While they viewed the English as valuable allies in the Cold War, they were also well aware that Britain’s power was on the wane and had no intention of being used as pawns to help support the crumbling British empire.
In the Soviet Union, Russian leader Joseph Stalin denounced the speech as “war mongering,” and referred to Churchill’s comments about the “English-speaking world” as imperialist “racism.”
*11) The transfer of sovereignty to the new federated Indonesian state took place on December 27, 1949. In August 1950, a unitary Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed, which successfully defeated several Dutch-backed rebellions in the outer islands.
*12) A Self-Criticism by the PKI Political Bureau after the 1965 right-wing coup summarized the political weaknesses of the party during this period: “The P.K.I. entered the 1945 August Revolution without adequate preparations. Its serious shortcoming in theory and its lack of understanding of the concrete conditions of Indonesian society had resulted in its inability to formulate the nature of the revolution, its tasks, its programme, tactics and slogans, as well as the correct principles and forms of organization…..
The P.K.I. was unable to make use of this highly favourable opportunity given by the August Revolution of 1945 to overcome its shortcomings. The P.K.I. did not consistently lead the armed struggle against Dutch imperialism, did not develop guerrilla warfare that was integrated with the democratic movement of the peasants, thus winning their full support, as the only way to defeat the war of aggression launched by the Dutch imperialists. On the contrary, the P.K.I. even approved of and itself followed the policy of reactionary compromises of Sjahrir’s right-wing socialists. The P.K.I. did not establish the alliance of the working class and the peasantry by leading the anti-feudal struggle in the countryside, and did not establish, on the basis of such a worker-peasant alliance, a united front with all other democratic forces. The P.K.I. did not consolidate its strength, on the contrary, it even relegated to the background its own role.”
“Statement of the Political Bureau of the Indonesian Communist Party,” 17.August, 1966,